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Section I
Introduction

A. Comparative Data on the Amount of Litigation

There are many lawsuits in the United States. America is a
litigious society.
Japan.

On the other hand, there are far fewer lawsuits in

For example, comparing the number of products liability

actions, about 15,000 cases were brought in America's federal district
courts in 1990,' and it is estimated that the amount reaches 60,000
to 100,000 or more cases every year when one includes those brought

'. ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS, FED.JUD. WORKLD.STATISTICS
DEC.31
1990, at 30 (1991).
1

2
in state courts.2

In contrast,

there have been only 140 products

cases3 in total since 1945 in Japan.4
The number of lawyers reflects this situation.
lawyers in the United States is about 650,000,
Japan number only about 13,000.5

The number of

whereas attorneys

in

Considering that the population

of

Japan is about half that of the United States, the United States has
nearly 26 times as many lawyers per person as Japan.
reference to the low number of Japanese lawyers,

For additional

England has 10

H.KOBAYASHI, PRODUCTSLIABILITYACTIONSIN USA, EC, JAPAN
65,(1990), citing U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE,PRODUCTSLIABILITY:EXTENT
OF "LITIGATIONEXPLOSION"IN FEDERALCOURTSQUESTIONED(1988)
[hereinafter GAD Report], in which it was reported that about 23 % of
all products liability actions might be brought to federal courts. Id. at
2.

40.
YASUDA RESEARCHINSTITUTECO.,LTD., SEIZOSUTSUSEKININ
[Products Liability - Problem in International of Enterprise (1989)
[hereinafter YASUDA RESEARCH]
(translation by this writer).
3.

4. Though the number of cases are small in Japan, awards are not
necessarily small. In Japan, the average award in products liability
actions was about 2,800,000 U.S. dollars from 1980 through 1984
(YASUDA RESEARCH,supra note 3, at 403 - 63), whereas, for example,
in San Francisco, that was about 1,100,000 U.S. dollars during the
same period (PETERSON,CIVIL JURIESIN THE 1980s : TRENDSIN JURY
TRIALSAND VERDICTSIN CALIFORNIAAND COOKCOUNTY,ILLINOIS(INSTITUTE
FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, 1987)).

HOMUDAIJINKANBOJINJIKA [Minister of Justice, Secretariat
Personnel Division], ed., SHIHOSHIKEN
KAIKAKU 0 KANGAERU[Study
About Bar Examination Reform](translation
by this writer), JURISUTO,
Aug. 5, 1987, at 86 - 87 [hereinafter JURISUTO,Aug. 5, 1987].
5.

3
times, West Germany before reunification had 7 times, and France has
2.6 times as many lawyers per person as Japan.6 In this instance,
there is an argument that, when comparing the number of lawyers, we
should "include not only Japanese practicing lawyers, but also
Japanese company employees in legal departments, Japanese who
draft legal documents (called judicial scriveners and administrative
scriveners), and Japanese patent attorneys and tax attorneys. ,,7
Those who so argue claim further that if these legal workers are taken
into consideration, "the United States figure is approximately twice
that of Japan[,]"8 and therefore, it should not be considered that there
are far few lawyers in Japan. However, since Article 72 of the
Japanese Attorney Code prohibits these workers from representing
clients, their legal role is necessarily quite limited. Also considering the
legal education and training which these quasi-lawyers receive,9 it

6.

Id.

7. Kate, The role of Law and Lawyers in Japan and the United
States, 1987 B.Y.U.L.REV. 627, 651 - 53.
8.

Id. at 653.

Id. at 654. See also id. at 655 n.35. For example, Kate
indicated, only 36 % of judicial scriveners are college graduates.
9.

4
\

would seem that these legal workers "should not be compared to
American lawyers."

10

B. Reasons for Non-litigiousness in Japan

Both the United States and Japan are highly industrialized
countries and there are many products commonly used in both
countries.

Therefore, it is quite likely that consumers in Japan have

suffered injuries due to defects in products which are similar to those
which have caused injury in the United States.

If so, why is the

number of lawsuits in Japan so small? It may be argued that the rate
of defective products sold in Japan is less than the amount of those
sold in the United States.

But that factor cannot explain the big

difference.
Traditionally, another explanation has surfaced.

It has been

asserted that Japanese do not like lawsuits, or that Japanese do not
have a refined consciousness of rights and duties.11

However, it is

undeniable that there are many people who do not like lawsuits in

10.

Id. at 655.

". Id. at 662 - 64 citing T. KAWASHIMA,NIHONJINNo HOISHIKI
[Legal Consciousness of the Japanese] (1967).

5
either country, the United States or Japan.12

Further, how can it be

explained that in 1986, the number of consultations by the Ministry of
Justice on human rights violations has become 90 times that of
1945713

Therefore, it seems that these traditional explanations are

not persuasive. Rather, it is the contention of this writer that this is
because the institution of civil actions are structured in a manner to
discourage people from bringing a lawsuit.

Two developments support

this contention, the first being a personal reaction.

I came to think this

way from my involvement in a lawsuit in Japan concerning a real
estate transaction.

Further, there is an interesting report which seems

to support my personal conclusion.

In a questionnaire to the public on

whether they would consider going to court when they felt that their
rights had been violated, half of them answered that they would not
consider it except under extreme circumstances.

In the same report,

about 60 % answered that they considered that the cost of lawsuits
was likely to be greater than the benefits.14

In this thesis, I will show

12. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 Journal of
Japanese Studies 359, 365 (1978).
13.

JURISUTO
, Aug. 5, 1987, supra note 5, at 91.

NIHONBUNKAKAIGI[Japan Cultural Conference], ed., GENOAI
NIHONJINNo HOISHIKI[Legal Consciousness of the Contemporary
Japanese] 90 (1973).
14.

6
that popular stereotype is right. This paper will also demonstrate what
impact the non-litigiousness in Japan is having on the Japanese
society.
To achieve this objective, I focus here on products liability
actions for two reasons. First, the number of Japanese consumers
who suffered injuries due to defect of products should nearly be half
the American consumers who suffered injuries due to defect of
products.

There will be a small reduction in numbers attributable to

the fact that products sold in Japan may be less defective than those
sold in the United States. This will be a modest variable, however.
Therefore, if the number of actions in Japan does not reach 40 or 50

% of the American figure (and it actually does not), we may be able to
conclude that there exist some factors which discourage litigation by
Japanese consumers.

Second, in products liability actions, disputes

arise mostly between strangers. Therefore, people are likely to be less
restrained in bringing lawsuits in courts, so that we can exclude social
factors to a great extent.15

That is, the small number of products

liability actions is presumably attributed to the ineffectiveness or
defectiveness of the Japanese judicial system.

By comparing the civil

Tanase, The Management of Disputes: Automobile Accident
Compensation in Japan, 24 Law & Society Review 651, 659.
15.

7
procedure applicable in products liability actions, the special inhibitions
to suit in the Japanese system will be revealed most clearly.

Section II
Comparison of Civil Procedure in Products Liability
Actions between the United States and Japan

A. Introduction

In order to facilitate comparisons in civil procedure between the
United States and Japan in products liability actions, consider a hypothetical case in which Alpha sues Beta, an auto manufacturer, on the
ground that while A was driving a car manufactured by B, the car set
on a fire. The cause of the fire was overheating of conduit wired in
the car, and overheating was due to defectiveness of the conduit.

A

was heavily burned. Also suppose that similar accidents have been
sometimes reported on cars of the same type, but that since the cars
were slightly burned in those accidents, no injuries have been reported

8

9
so far.16

In such a case, if the case were brought in a court in the

United States, plaintiff could invoke any of three legal theories: (1)
negligence; (2) warranty; and (3) strict liability.

On the other hand, if

the case were brought in a court of Japan, a plaintiff could invoke (1)
and/or (2), but could not invoke (3). In other words, in Japan, strict
liability in product liability actions has not been established so far. 17
Products liability actions are governed by general unlawful act statutes.18 As a result, a plaintiff is always required to prove that the
defendant is negligent.
The following sections will show the differences between the
United States and Japan which may arise in civil litigation by using the
aforementioned hypothetical case. They will also show what impact

This hypothetical case is based on a case in which a fire broke
out in a car and two children in the car were killed. See. Judgment of
July 18, 1983, Tokyo Chisai (District Court of Tokyo), Japan, 1099
HANJI67.
16.

Recently there is movement for legislation on products liability in
Japan. KOBAYASHI,
supra note 2, at 207-08.
17.

18. "Most courts in Japan have taken an general unlawful act
approach to products liability cases in absence of privity." Id. at 30.
As to a general unlawful act, MINPO[Civil Code of Japan], art.709
provides: A person who violates intentionally or negligently the right of
another is bound to make compensation for damage arising therein
(emphasis added).

10
the difference in civil procedure may have on the attitude of Japanese
toward litigation.

B. Commencement of An Action

1. Possibility of mass tort claims

In the hypothetical case, it is often difficult to prove whether or
not the damage was really caused by the defectiveness of the conduit
of the car, and such proof ill require many people to engage in investigation, as well as the expenditure of significant money. Therefore, it
is preferable to aggregate persons who have sustained damage and to
enlarge the amount to be recovered, so that plaintiffs can cover that
cost. That is, except for persons heavily injured, the amount of
damages of individual claimants will be small. Therefore, if they
should sue B separately, the cost of litigation would exceed the
amount of recovery, and thus no person would bring a lawsuit in a
court.

a. Requirements of class action
For a case like this, American civil procedure provides a procedural device called "class action", in which a single person or small

11
group of co-parties may represent a large group or "class" of persons
sharing a common interest (Rule 23(a)). As prerequisites for a class
action to be allowed, Rule 23(a) requires 4 elements:
(1 ) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and; (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
In addition, "[ilt is axiomatic that before class action should be permitted to proceed as such, an identifiable class must exist,

"19

and at

least one of "the representatives [must] be members of the class
•••• "20

The latter is required because "if they have a personal stake in

the outcome of the litigation, the representatives are likely to undertake a full prosecution or defence.

"21

In any event "[o]rdinarily,

the

judge has broad discretion in determining whether these requirements
have been met. n22

19. FRIEDENTHAL
& KANE& MILLER,CIVILPROCEDURE
§ 16.2, at 727
(1985),[hereinafter FRIEDENTHAL].

Id. at 727. See also Hunter V. Atchinson & S.F.Ry. Co., 188
F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1951), certiorari denied 342 U.S.819 (1951).
20.

21.

Id. at 727.

22.

Id. at 726.
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b. Three categories
Even if the class action prerequisites are satisfied, the class
action will not be permitted unless the case falls into one of the three
categories of Rule 23(b). The first category, Rule 23(b)( 1), permits a
class action either: "(a) when the prosecution of separate actions
might result in inconsistent or varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class"23; Rule 23(b)( 1)(A); or "(b) when individual litigation might
result in judgments that would be dispositive of the interests of other
members of the class who are not parties to those individual actions"24 ; Rule 23(b)(1 )(8). "Loosely conceived, this category might
be thought of as the 'anti-prejudice' class action.

It permits class

action treatment if individual actions would result in prejudice to the
party opposing the class or to members of the class itself."

25

matic considerations dictate whether prejudice will be found.

"Prag"26

In

this respect, however, when a class certification was requested in
mass tort claims on the theory that if there is no class certification,

23.

Id. at 732.

24.ld.
25.ld.
26.ld.
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individual plaintiffs whose cases are not among the first tried may find
their interests impaired because the damages may rapidly overwhelm a
defendant's limited assets, the Ninth Circuit turned down the class
certification.27

The second category of a class action, Rule 23(b)(2),

is allowed "when (1) the party opposing the class has acted or refused
to act on grounds generally applicable to the class as a whole, and (2)
the class representatives are seeking final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief. "28 This category of Rule 23 "is used
most often for civil rights suits and in other constitutional

litiga-

tion .... "29 The third type of class action is provided for by rule 23
(b)(3). Three elements are necessary for its maintenance, two of
which are stated in Rule 23(b)(3), namely: "( 1) common questions of
law or fact must predominate over questions that only affect individual
class members, [and] (2) the class action procedure must be superior
to other means of adjudicating the controversy[.]"30

The third ele-

ment is: "(3) the last notice practicable must be given to the class

27.

In re N. Dist. of California Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liability

Litigation, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), certiorari denied 459 U.S.
1171 (1983).
28.

FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 19, § 16.2, at 733.

29.ld.
30.

Id. at 734.

14
members of the institution of the action and of their right to exclude
themselves from the class[;]"31 Rule 23(c)(2).32 The third type of
class action provided by Rule 23(b)(3) is usually unsuitable for mass
tort actions "because claims for damages ... are predicated upon the
unique features of each individual case, affecting causation no less
than the quantum of damages. "33 One commentator adds: "EspecialIy products liability ... cases are not based on a single, but a series of
discrete events.

The particular circumstances of plaintiff's use of the

product and personal knowledge of the danger will almost always
differ, as may the governing law and statute of limitations. "34

c. Effect of a class action decision
Judgment in a class action "will be binding on all class members
whether they actually participated in the case or not. This is an
exception to the general rule that persons who have not had their own

31.

Id.

32. "This third requirement is not stated in Rule 23(b)(3) but is
made mandatory by Rule 23(c)(2) to all actions under that subdivision." Id. at 734 n.63.
33.J.FLEMING,THEAMERICANTORTPROCESS
240-41 (1988). See
also Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure
on Rule 23(b)(3).
34. FLEMING,supra note 33, at 241.

15
day in court cannot be bound by any judgment.

"35

That is, members

of a Rule 23(b)(1) class and a Rule 23(b)(2) class may not opt out of
the class and bring their own suits. But members of a Rule 23(b)(3)
class can opt out of the class and bring their own suits.36
because"[i]nsuits

This is

under Rule 23(b)(3), class members typically are

associated with one another only by the fact that they are asserting
common issues of law or fact[,] [and] [u]sually no pre-existing or
ongoing legal relationships exist among them, and individual members
may have different remedial objectives.

"37

d. Mass tort claims in Japan
As a device for facilitating mass litigation, Japanese civil procedure provides a plurality of parties with the device of "senteitojisha"
[appointed parties]. That is, for example, many people injured by
defect of the same product can appoint one or more person among
them to bring lawsuits against the manufacturer of the product and

35.

FRIEDENTHAl,

supra note 19, § 16.8, at 756.

Id. § 16.6, at 752. This conclusion can be led from the discrepant treatment between 23(b)( 1) and (2) class actions and 23(b)(3)
class actions on the necessity of notice to members of a class. See id.
at 751 .
36.

37.

Id. at 752.

16
entrust such persons with their claims.38
"senteitojisha"[appointed

39

In order to use

parties], parties must have a joint interest.

", A plurality of parties with a joint interest' means those who may sue
or be sued as co-litigants, and have main means of attack or defence
in common.

"40

Also, "senteitojisha"[appointed

parties] must be

appointed by such parties. Accordingly, "senteitojisha" can never
represent people who have not appointed them, even if such people
have the same "joint interest" as parties who have appointed
"senteitojisha".

In other words, judgment on "senteit6jisha" will be

binding only on the parties who have appointed "senteit6jisha."

It will

never be binding effect on the others. "Senteit6jisha" may do all acts
of procedure including compromise in regard to the action.

38. See MINSOHO [Code of Civil Procedure], art.47 (Japan) which
provides: A plurality of parties having a joint interest ... may appoint
one or more persons who is or are to be plaintiff(s) or defendant(s) for
the entire body, or alter such appointment.

"Senteitojisha"[appointed parties](translation by this Writer) is
one of a few exceptions to the principle that no person other than an
advocate (bengoshi) may act as a process-attorney. See MINSOHO
[Code of Civil Procedure], art.79 (Japan).
39.

40. Judgment of April 9, 1940, Oaishin'in (Great Court of Judicature), Japan, 19 Daihan MinshQ 695.
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e. Comparison between class action and "senteit6jisha"
As shown in section II B 1 b, in products liability litigation, a
class action is not necessarily suitable and is not used very often.
Therefore, whether or not civil procedure provides a device like a class
action for facilitating mass litigation, may not have accounted for the
big difference in the number of products liability actions between the
United States and Japan. In any event, the biggest difference between a class action (especially Rule 23(b)(3) action) and the device of
"senteit6jisha" is in that: in a class action, judgment is binding whether
it is for or against the class even on a person who has not had his own
day in court,41 unless he excludes himself from the class by notifying
the court (Rule 23(c)(3)); conversely, in the device of "senteit6jisha", a
judgment is not binding on a person who has not made appointment of
"senteit6jisha".

This difference may not directly affect the injured

persons' decision on whether or not they bring lawsuits against manufacturers.

However, it seems to me that a class action makes it easier

for lawyers to aggregate many plaintiffs than the device of
"senteit6jisha", because they may more easily persuade people whom
the court will find to be members of the class on the ground that those

41.

See section II B 1 c.

18
people will lose opportunities to bring their own lawsuits.

As a result,

it is not surprising that lawyers actively solicit people for bringing
lawsuits.42

Though indirectly, this will result in facilitating and pro-

moting the filing of lawsuits by people. Thus, it is contended to me
that the device of class action is, to some extent, contributing to more
filings of products liability actions in the United States than in Japan.

2. Availability of lawyers

a. Accessibility of appropriate lawyers
The population per lawyer in Japan is about 9,200, whereas that
in the United States is about 360.43

One lawyer in Japan points out

"[it is deplorable that] it is an usual situation that normal citizens do
not know where to go, when they want to consult lawyers."

44

According to the survey by the Japanese Bar association in 1985, only
2.8 % of citizens who got involved in legal disputes actually consulted

42.

FLEMING,
supra note 33, at 248.

43.

JURISUTO,Aug 5, 1987, supra note 5, at 86.

44.

Id. at 66 quoting TAKAMIZAWA,GENOAINo BENGOSHI
- SHIMINHEN

[Contemporary Lawyers - With Citizens] (1982)(translation
writer) .

by this

19
with lawyers.45

Accordingly, it is not surprising to note that the rate

of litigation in which plaintiffs do not use attorneys is sometimes quite
high: in 1985, it was 19.3 % in Chih6 Saibansho (District Court) and
86.5 % in Kan'i Saibansho (Summary Court or courts of petty jurisdiction for minor civil and criminal cases).46Since the number of Japanese lawyers is small, there has been almost no competition among
them so far. In consequence, Japanese lawyers neglect to specialize
in a particular field or explore new fields.47 That means it is all the
more difficult for people to find an appropriate lawyer who can provide
highly specialized legal service which people need more and more,
today.

Also, there is an image about lawyers among citizens that they

are often arrogant and difficult to approach.48

This may, to some

extent, discourage people from consulting to lawyers.

Since legal

matters are generally too difficult for ordinary citizens to handle for
themselves, the inaccessibility of lawyers in Japan mentioned above,

45.

Id.

46.

Id. at 100.

47.

Id. at 62.

Id. at 66 quoting speech by Mr. Kimura (Osaka Bengoshi kai
[Osaka Bar Association]) at a seminar held by ChOgoku Bengoshi
Rengokai [ChOgoku Federation of Bar Association].
48.

20
seems to have a great effect on the small dimensions of litigation in
~apan. 49

b. Issue of the contingent fee
"The plaintiff's attorney fees in American tort litigation are
almost invariably fixed on a contingency basis. If the plaintiff wins, his
attorney will be paid, typically in proportion to the award recovered,
say one-third; if the plaintiff loses, his attorney will be paid
nothing.

"50

The contingent fee "[relieves] the plaintiff from his own

attorney's fee if he loses, [by shifting] the risk of loss from him to the
attorney.

"51

Of course, there are some criticisms against the

contingent fee. One objection is that"

these rates [of the contingent

fees] are unfair. "52 But such a view overlooks the fact that the
attorney has lots of unsuccessful cases. That is, in order to maintain
the system of contingent fees, "the successful plaintiff [has to] pay[]
not only his own legal costs but also those of his attorney's

See e.g., Zadankai, Minjisaiban To Shimin [A Discussion: Civil
Action and Citizen], 971 JURISUTO 28 (1991 )(translation by this writer).
49.

supra note 33, at 195.

50.

FLEMING,

51.

Id. at 197.

52.

Id. at 199.

21
unsuccessful clients. "53 In this respect, "[p]laintiffs,

as a class, seem

, to prefer not having to pay legal fees when they lose, even if as a
trade-off they have to pay more if they win. "54 "Another complaint
is that the contingent fee encourages unmeritorious litigation, aggravating crowded dockets and delay of trials. "55 But this will be tempered because the attorney will calculate whether the case is worth
taking the risk for, and will not waste effort on unproductive causes.56 Conversely this indicates that "the contingent fee probably
does encourage speculative litigation by transferring the risk of loss
from the client to the lawyer, who, in a high volume of business, is
more likely to be risk-neutral than a one-time client. "57 In other
words, "[the contingent feel provides easier access to justice for
plaintiffs irrespective of their financial resources. "58 The cost of
litigation -- inter alia attorney's fee -- is enormous. Even when the
plaintiffs win, it is so huge that it sometimes makes their success

53.

Id. at 200.

54.

Id.

55.

Id. at 203.

56.

Id. at 203-04.

57.

Id. at 204.

58.

Id. at 197.
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economically meaningless. Accordingly, if the plaintiffs have to pay
your attorney's fee when they lose, their economic loss would be
unbearable. In this respect, the contingent fee clearly contributes to
the big number of products liability litigations in the United States.
On the other hand, the plaintiff's attorney fees in Japanese
products liability litigation are fixed on "a kind of contingency
basis" .59 That is, when plaintiff asks an attorney to file a claim, the
plaintiff has to pay, in advance, the attorney "Chakushukin" [undertaking fee], e.g., 10 % of the amount of claim. And when the plaintiff
wins, he pays additional amount, e.g., 10 % of the amount of claim,
as a success reward.

When the plaintiff loses, he does not have to

pay anything more. "Chakushukin" [undertaking fee] is not refunded
to the plaintiff whether he wins or loses. Such a system, together
with almost no competition among attorneys, may have resulted in a
situation wherein "lawyers confined themselves primarily to cases with
a very high return and very high prospect of success and denying their
services to others"60 on one hand, and it may discourage people
H.TANAKA,EIBEIHO
No KOTOBA[Terms of Anglo-American Law]
107 (1986Htranslation by this writer).
59.

60. FLEMING,
supra note 33, at 200-01, which points out that there
is a possibility that lawyers act in such a manner. But professor Fleming concludes:
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from filing lawsuits on the other hand.51 In any event, it seems that
, the "quasi contingent fee" in Japan does not provide easier access to
justice for plaintiffs irrespective of their resources. 52

3. Costs

The parties instituting any civil action in American courts are
required to pay about 100 U.S.dollars to the district court for the
action.63

This filing fee is a fixed amount irrespective of the claimed

amount in the United States. On the other hand, the filing fee in
Japan increases in proportion to the claimed amount. As a result, if
the amount to be sought is 50,000 U.S.dollars, the filing fee is about
300 U.S.dollars.

If the amount which is sought is 1,000,000

U.S.

However, this is not a serious problem in fact, because the
more successful trial attorneys vie for opportunities of
forensic success in speculative and spectacular cases.
Besides, fierce competition at the bar means that litigants
are more likely to find a champion even beyond the point
where the chance of success becomes so unreasonable
that it would no longer be in the public interest to encourage litigation (emphasis added).

61.

TANAKA,supra note 60, at 109.

62.

See note 58.

63.

KOBAYASHI,
supra note 2, at 16. See also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1914(a).

24
dollars it amounts to about 5,000 U.S.dollars.64

Of course, if the

\ plaintiff wins he can recover it from the defendant.65

But considering

that the plaintiff is usually a person who sustained economic loss such
as a doctor's fee, loss of income or the cost of purchasing a new
product, the filing fee in Japanese civil action could be one of the
factors that discourage plaintiffs from bringing lawsuits.66

C. Issues Raised from Pleading until Adjudication

1. Burden of proof

a. Generally
In the United States, since the theory of strict liability in tort is
available for an injured plaintiff's use in seeking recovery against the
manufacturer of products, the plaintiff does not have to prove that the
defendant was negligent, or he failed to act in a reasonably prudent

See MINJI SOSHOHIVO
TO NI KANSURUHORITSU[code of Costs of
Civil Actions and Other Related Matters], BEPPVO
DAIICHI[Appended
Table No.1 Htranslation by this writer).
64.

MINSOHO[Code of Civil Procedure], art.a9 (Japan) which provides: [t]he costs of the suit shall be borne by the party defeated.
65.

KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 16, which says that it is undeniable
that in case of the action seeking a big amount, it will be easier for a
plaintiff to file a claim in the United States than in Japan.
66,
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manner in the design, product or sale of his product.

Instead, he only

, has to prove: (1) that a defect existed in the product made by the
defendant67; (2) that the defect had been present when the product
left the control of the defendant; (3) his injury or damage; (4) the
causal connection between the defect and the his injury or damage.68
On the other hand, in Japan, because strict liability does not
apply in products liability actions, the plaintiff has a higher measure of
proof.

She must prove: (1) that the defendant was negligent69;

(2)

the defendant violated a provision of law by his negligent act; (3) his
injury or damage; (4) the causal connection between the defendant's
negligence and his injury or damage. 70 Ultimately, the main difference between the United States and Japan in the area of burden of
proof in products liability actions is that "[u]nder the doctrine of strict
liability in tort [applicable in the United States], ... it is unnecessary to
prove the defendant's negligence."71

The following section will

67.

1 M.MADDEN,PRODUCTS
LIABILITY§2.12, at 41-42(2d ed. 1988).

68.

Id. § 2. 14, at 47.

69.

See section II A.

lTC, KIHONHCKONMENTAARU
- SAIKENKAKURON[Commentary on
Basic Laws - Particulars of Obligations] 226-39 (the Hogaku Seminar
Bessatu No.89, 1988)(translation by this writer).
70.

71.

5 S.SPEISER
& C.KRAUSE& A.GANS, Law of Torts § 2. 14, at 47.
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demonstrate the difference between the United States and Japan
, caused by the adoption of the doctrine in one country, the United
States.

b. Strict Iiabilitv vs. Negligence
1) Historical development in the United States
"To many observers the most dramatic innovation of American
tort law is the strict liability of manufacturers and distributors of
products introduced in the 1960's.

"72

However, "[h]istorically

the

prerequisite of proving privity inhibited the use of negligence theories
to seek recovery against the manufacturers of products.

"73

That is,

in the nineteenth century, as the result of the English decision of
Winterbottom v. Wright,74 which was based on contractual obligations, and the approval of its rule in the United States courts/5

"a

manufacturer could avoid liability to an indirect or secondary purchaser, or any entity not the direct buyer, on the grounds that there was no
privity , and a corresponding duty in either contract or in tort between

72.

FLEMING,

supra note 33, at 56-57.

73. BALDWIN& HARE& MCGOVERN,
THEPREPARATION
OFA PRODUCT
LIABILITYCASE § 1.0.1, at 5 (1981).

74.

10 M.& W.1 09 (1842), 152 Eng Rep. 402 (Ex. 1952).

75.

1 MADDEN,supra note 67, § 1.2, at 7.
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them.

"76

In this respect, "it was more difficult to file a tort claim

against a manufacturer in the United States than in Japan in which
there was no requirement corresponding to privity.

"77

However, in 1916 New York's highest court stated a new and
general rule of manufacturer liability in negligence in MacPherson v.
Buick78 as follows:
If the nature of things is such that it is reasonably certain
to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, then
it is a thing of danger. Its nature gives warning of the
consequences to be expected. If to the element of danger
there is added knowledge that the thing will be used by
persons other than the purchaser, and used without new
tests, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of
this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully ..
.. We have put aside the notion that the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negligence
may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else.
We have put the source of the obligation where it ought to
be. We have put its source in the law (emphasis added).

76.

Id. at 8.

77.

KOBAYASHI

supra note 2, at 9.

MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.382 (1916). This
was a personal injury action brought by the purchaser of a new automobile, the wheel on which proved defective, causing both injury to
the driver and damage to the automobile. Defendant, the
manufacturer - assembler, had bought the wheel from another
manufacturer, but had bought the wheel from another manufacturer,
but had omitted to inspect the wheel before placing it upon the car. In
the litigation, the defendant alleged that plaintiff could bring no action
against the defendant, because plaintiff had purchased the automobile
from a dealer, and there was no privity of contract between plaintiff
and defendant. See 1 MADDEN, supra note 67, § 1.2, at 10.
78.
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Thus, MacPherson

created a new rule on negligence liability without

privity for the manufacturer of a product capable of causing great harm
if negligently made.79 Macpherson

had a significant impact and is

now accepted by all American courts. The manufacturer's liability for
negligence "is not limited to a failure to exercise reasonable care in the
production phase. "80 That is, "a manufacturer may be held liable for
negligence in mislabeling in failing to warn for negligent installation or
inspection, or for an unsafe or defective design. "81
While MacPherson

established liability of a manufacturer for negli-

gence for third persons notwithstanding

lack of privity of contract, "[it]

did not ensure recovery unless plaintiff could show that the defendant
was negligent, i.e., that the defendant failed to exercise the care of a
reasonably careful and prudent manufacturer.

"82

Since "the control

of the manufacturing and distribution process was in the hands of [the
manufacturer], ...

[and] evidence of comparable persuasiveness

frequently was unavailable to the plaintiff ...

79.

1 MADDEN, supra note 67, § 1.2, at 12.

8°./d. at 12-13.
81./d.at13.
82.

/d.

83.

/d.

, "83 this was still
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burdensome for a plaintiff.

To relieve the plaintiff of this burden one

,conceivable solution was to use contractual actions in warranty.

That

is, "[ulnless expressly disclaimed, each sale of a product by a merchant of such goods carries with it an implied warranty that the
product is substantially similar in safety, quality, and performance, to
similar products sold generally. "84

85

"Occasionally the warranty ap-

proach worked admirably for the plaintiff, for a claim based on the
defendant's breach of his promise, express or implied to furnish goods

Id. §1.1, at 3. UCC §2-314( 1) imposes implied warranty of
merchantability as a matter of law. §2-314(1) provides: [U]nless
excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind.
84.

See also e.g., Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 Ohio App.475,
161 N.E.557 (1928). The Court says:
85.

The Baking Company, when it delivered the cake in question to
the groceryman, ... impliedly represented to the public, who is
the ultimate consumer, that this cake is free from injurious
substances and fit for consumption as food. There is no doubt
that an implied warranty arises between the groceryman who
purchased the cake and the Baking Company. Since the Baking
Company was fully aware that the Groceryman did not purchase
the cakes for his own consumption, but purchased the same
instead for the purpose of selling the same to members of the
public, ... this implied obligation which unquestionably arose in
favor of the groceryman may be legally said to have also arisen
for the benefit of the consumer. (emphasis added).

30
of fit and merchantable quality, would not depend on proof of negligence .••86
Unfortunately, the warranty action did not work effectively when
the plaintiff brought his action against the person whose product he
purchased if he was not the original purchaser of the product, since
privity did not exist between them.87

And today, "it has become

relatively rare for the manufacturer to have any direct dealing with the
ultimate user. n88 There-fore, the availability of the warranty action
was necessarily restricted by the necessity of privity between plaintiff
and defendant.

To permit an injured plaintiff to maintain a warranty

action against a manufacturer, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
in Henningsten v. Bloomfield Motors Inc,. 89 that:
although plaintiff based her claim on breach of warranty
from a defective mechanism in a car purchased by her
husband, it was not necessary that she be in privity with
the manufacturer. A manufacturer is strictly liable when
an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be

86.

1 MADDEN, supra note 67, § 1.2, at 14.

87.

See id.

88.

89.

Id.
32 N.J.358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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used without inspection for defects, proves to have a
defect that causes injury to a human being.90
Even if privity requirement was eliminated, a plaintiff seeking to
recover under a breach of warranty theory is still faced with several
problems. One is that the manufacturer may make a written disclaimer
of the warranty of merchantability.

91

Another is that "the plaintiff

may be limited in damages he can recover. Under Alternatives A and
8 of § 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the damages for the
breach of warranty are limited to personal injuries, and do not include
property damage. "92

90.

93

"The plaintiff is also required to give timely

5 SPEISER
& KRAUSE& GANS,supra note 71, § 18.2, at 485,

n.24.
91.

UCC §2-316(2) says:
Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language
must mention merchantability and in case of a writing
must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied
warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example,
that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the
description of the fact hereof."

92.

1 MADDEN,supra note 67, §2.7, at 33.

93.

UCC §2-318:
Alternative A;
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who is in the family or household of his
buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to
expect that such person may use, consume or be affected
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notice of the breach of warranty , and his failure to do so may preclude him from later maintaining an action. "9495 In addition, in the
majority of states which have adopted Alternative A of § 2-318 of the
Uniform Commercial Code,96 "the plaintiff must show that he is
either the beneficiary or a third party beneficiary of the warranty, ...
this constitutes to be the greatest obstacle to recovery in Warranty. "97 Thus, although the warranty action provides for liability without fault in the sense that negligence by the defendant does not have
to be proven,98 there are still several obstacles to successful

by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the
warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation
of this section,
Alternative B;
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to
any natural person who may reasonably be expected to
use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is
injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may
not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
94. 1 MADDEN, supra note 67, §2.7, at 34.
95. UCC §2-607 (3)(a): Where a tender has been accepted the
buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have
discovered any breach or be barred from any remedy ....
96.

See supra note 91 .

97. 1 MADDEN, supra note 67, §2.7, at 34.
98. 5 SPEISER & KRAUSE & GANS, supra note 71, §18.30, at 720.

"

.~
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recovery.

A number of contract defenses exist in breach of warranty

\ cases.99
The implied warranty action was not the only approach utilized in
American courts to relieve a plaintiff from the burden of proving that
the defendant was negligent. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling

Co. of

Fresno.,1oo the California Supreme Court used the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur to affirm a finding of liability against a soft drink bottling
company, the defendant, whose bottle exploded in plaintiff's hand as
plaintiff transferred it from its case to a refrigerator.

The plaintiff was

unable to prove any act of negligence on the part of the
defendant.101

"[T]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits the

plaintiff to shift to the defendant the burden of proof on the issue of

See e.g., id. However, once these defenses are eliminated from
warranty actions, "there is little difference between the two theories of
liability .... " Id.
99.

100.

24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).

101.See 1 MADDEN, supra note 67, § 1.2, at 17. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Traynor "argued forcefully that it was time for that
court to disembarrass itself of the legal fictions of res ipsa loquitur,
and to adopt instead 'absolute liability' upon manufacturers placing
products upon the market." Id. However, "[n]either Justice Traynor's
own California Supreme Court nor any other American Court adopted
his proposal in its entirety until 1963, in the same court's decision in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc." (59 Cal.2d 57,377 P.2d 897
(1963)). Id. at 18.
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negligence ....

"102 "In leaving it to the jury to decide whether the

~nference [that the defect of a product arose from the negligence from
the manufacturer] has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence
against it, the negligence rule approaches the rule of strict
liability. "103 However, "it is needlessly circuitous to make
negligence the basis of recovery and impose what is in reality liability
without negligence"104 and "such a procedure ...

engenders

wasteful litigation." 105Therefore, "[i]f public policy demands that a
manufacturer of goods be responsible for their quality of regardless of
negligence there is no reason not to fix that responsibility openly. ,,106
It was in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc. 107in 1963
that "[t]he court

[for the first time] announced its readiness to create

a new strict liability remedy in which plaintiff needn't rely upon either
warranty or upon a showing of defendant's negligence. "108 In that
102.ld. §4.13, at 137.
103.Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.of Fresno., 150 P.2d 436, 441
(1944) (Traynor, concurring).
104.

Id.

105.

Id. at 442.

106.

Id. at 441.

107.59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
108.1 MADDEN, supra note 67, § 1.2, at 18.
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case, plaintiff purchased a Shopsmith , a combination power tool
m,anufactured by the defendant.

It could be used as a saw, drill and

wood lathe. Plaintiff was injured when a piece of wood flew out of
the machine while he was using it as a wood lathe and struck him in
the head. Though it was enough for the court to have affirmed the
judgment for the plaintiff on the ground of breach of an express
warranty to solve the case, "the court went on to announce the strict
liability doctrine as an additional basis for affirming the judgment."

109

The Court says;
[T]o impose strict liability on the manufacturer under the circumstances of this case, it was not necessary for plaintiff to establish an express warranty [under the Uniform Sales Act]. A
manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on
the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for
defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being.110
Two years after Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, the final draft of
Restatement, Second, Torts § 402A was published. It provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and

109.

5 SPEISER
& KRAUSE& GANS,supra note 71, § 18.2, at 487-88

n.28.
110.

377 P 2d 897, 900.
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(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is
sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
This provision has been adopted in a majority of American jurisdictions.
"[S]trict liability in tort as stated in Restatement Second, Torts §402A
has created its own epoch in American torts jurisprudence."'"

It is

interesting that "one of [the] mooted attractions [of products liability]
was that it would reduce litigation by stopping up undeserved loopholes through which a guilty defendant might hope to escape. ""2

In

any event, "products liability was to transform the whole agenda of tort
litigation: inaugurating a new era of mass actions, mass costs, and
mass awards.113
2) Strict liability in Japan
As this paper mentioned earlier"4, in Japan products liability
actions are governed by the general unlawful act statute and the

111.

1 MADDEN, supra note 67, §1.2, at 19.

112.

FLEMING,

113.

Id.

114.

section II C 1 a.

supra note 33, at 61.
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plaintiff has to prove that the defendant was negligent.115

There-

fore, on the surface it seems much easier for plaintiffs in the United
States to prevail in a products liability action, because they do not
have to prove the negligence of the defendant.

However, in some

areas of products cases, this writer believes that this factor does not
supply a big difference between the United States and Japan due to
the following reasons. The lower courts in Japan in recent years
readily tend to find the negligence of manufacturers of particular
products such as food or drugs when they are defective, on the
grounds that such manufacturers are held to high-standard duty of
care and therefore, there should be "prima-facie presumption"

116

of

the negligence on the part of such manufacturers where the products
are defective.117

115.

For example, in a case where plaintiffs were bodily

See supra note 18.

By "prima-facie presumption" this writer means that the existence of a fact (presumed fact) is, in reality but not as a matter of law,
taken as established by the judge. Accordingly, it is sufficient for the
judge to support a finding on that issue in favor of the burdened party,
but he is not required to do so. It is in his discretion. In this respect
"prima-facie presumption" can be distinct from presumption in which
the burden of proof (the burden of persuasion) shifts to the opposite
party as a matter of law. In Japanese civil procedure, presumption
occurs only when there is a provision that the fact is presumed. See
KOBAYASHI, supra note 2 at 264-65.
116.

117.

KOBAYASHI,

supra note 2, at 132.
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injured through consumption of cooking oil which had been mixed with
\ poisonous polychlorinated biphenyl in the process of manufacturing of
the cooking oil,118the Court, holding for the plaintiffs, said that:
Where a person was died or bodily injured because of the consumption of the food in a defective condition, or the cause of
which had existed in the food at the time of the food's leaving
the control of the manufacturer, the negligence of the manufacturer or the seller in reality may be strongly presumed and that
presumption should not be dispelled unless the manufacturer or
the seller alleges and proves that the occurrence or existence of
the defective condition of the food would be unforeseeable at
the time of the food's leaving his control, even if he exercised
high-standard and strict duty of care imposed on food
manufacturers (translation by this writer).
In anther case in which the plaintiffs were damaged to their optic
nerves through consumption of drugs manufactured by the defendant
pharmaceutical company,119 Kanazawa Chisai (District Court of
Kanazawa) presumed that since drug manufacturers held the duty to
make their drugs safe in compliance with the highest level of pharmaceutics existing at the time the drugs were made, there was foreseeability and the possibility of avoidance of the harms on the part of the
defendant.

In this way, as long as food or drugs are concerned, courts

118.Judgment of Oct.5, 1977, Fukuoka Chisai (District Court of
Fukuoka), Japan 866 HANJI 21 .
119.Judgment of Mar.1, 1978, Kanazawa Chisai (District Court of
Kanazawa), Japan, 879 HANJI 26.
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in Japan tend to use "prima-facie presumption" 120with imposition of
, high-standard duty of care on such manufacturers and thus the standard of proof of negligence on the part of plaintiff is decreased to a
great extent.

As a result it could be said that in these areas, practice

in Japan is in reality approaching liability without fault or strict liability.121 However, in other areas, courts in Japan are hesitant to use
the approach they are employing in drugs or food cases.122 Considering this and the fact that there are many products liability actions
other than drugs or food cases such as asbestos cases 123in the
United States (while in Japan no asbestos case has been reported to
be filed so far124),the American adoption of strict liability seems to
be promoting products liability actions by giving injured plaintiffs a
strong expectation of judgments in their favor.125

120.

See supra note 116.

121.KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 134.
122.YASUDA RESEARCH, supra note 3, at 342.
123.9,994 out of 15,138 products liability actions which were
commenced in the United States District Court were asbestos cases in
1990. See Federal Judicial Workload Statistics, supra note 1, at 30.
124.KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 7.
125.Thus far, this writer has been assuming manufacturing defect
case to compare products liability actions in the United States with
those in Japan. As for design defect cases or inadequate warning
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c. Causation
"Whether the plaintiff's theory of recovery in a products liability
case is based upon ... strict tort liability, ... proof that a defect in the
products was a [cause-in-fact and] proximate or legal cause of the
injury is a prerequisite to recovery. "126

That is, first,

"the defendant's conduct [must] be a substantial contributing factor in
bringing about the harm. "127 But, second, "[e]ven where ... without
the defendant's conduct the loss would not have occurred, the
defendant will not be considered to have proximately caused the injury
where the chain of causation is too tenuous."

128

"In strict liability

cases they have heavy negligence aspects. And "any significant
distinctions between design defect evaluation in strict liability and in
negligence disappear." MADDEN, supra note 67, §8.1, at 291. This is
because:
Once the defendant's knowledge of the defect is imputed, strict
liability analysis becomes almost identical to negligence in its
focus on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. Feldman v.Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J.429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
Therefore, the argument in section II C 1 b 2) will also be appropriate
design defect cases. Especially, in drugs or food cases, the difference
between the United States and Japan seems to be still less than in
manufacturing defect cases. See KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 43-44.

126.

2 MADDEN, supra note 67, §14.2, at 40.

127./d.
128.

/d.

§14.1, at 40.
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... , plaintiff need not prove any specific act of negligence, but rather
mu~t prove that defendant's defective product caused the loss. "129
The problem here is that since all the information on manufacturing
process of products is in the manufacturer's hands, or the distributing
process of products nowadays has become very complicated, it 'is
often very difficult for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's
defective product caused the loss.130 In this respect, as is discussed
later,131the American civil procedure provides plaintiff with the
discovery device to facilitate to meet his burden of proof in causation,
but the Japanese civil procedure does not provide plaintiff with such a
device. As a result it is conceivable that plaintiffs in products litigation
in the United States will not feel much difficulty in proving the causation but those in Japan will have much difficulty.

In fact it is said that

in Japan plaintiffs are often forced to give up filing products liability
litigation with manufacturers because of the difficulty in proving the
causation.132

129.

Id. § 14.2, at 43.

130.KOBAYASHI, supra 24 note 2, at 47.
131.

See infra section II C 2 b.

132.KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 202-03.
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d. Summary
To summarize with respect to the burden of proof pertaining to
products liability, two matters can be pointed out which may encourage people in the United States to file a products liability claim and
discourage people in Japan from doing that.

One is that plaintiff in the

United States need not prove the negligence on the part of the defendant because of the adoption of strict liability, while plaintiff in Japan
must prove it with a few exceptions.133

As we see in the historical

development of products liability in the United States, 134 to prove
the negligence of the manufacturer was often burdensome for plaintiff.
Also comparably persuasive evidence which was in the hands of the
defendant-manufacturer was normally unavailable for plaintiff.

There-

fore, strict liability was introduced in the United States. That means
plaintiff in Japan is being placed in a very disadvantageous position.
The other is that to prove that a defect in the product was a cause-infact and proximate cause of the injury is facilitated in plaintiff's favor
through the discovery device in the United States, while such a device
is not available for plaintiff in Japan. Under the current circumstances
in which information on the manufacturing process of products is in

133.

See section II C 1 b 2).

134.

See section II C 1 b 1).
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the manufacturer's

hands, this may make it actually impossible for the

injured plaintiff in Japan to prevail in products liability litigation.135
Therefore, it seems that the difference in the allocation of burden of
proof in the products liability litigation between the United States and
Japan, is also one of major causes as to the difference in the number
of litigation between the two countries.
In this way various means have been invented in the United
States to promote filing of products liability litigation.

"The result has

been what is widely hailed as an 'explosion' of tort liability.

"136

"[A]nyone even remotely related who could have interceded to prevent
an accident [has become] exposed to the risk of substantial liability.

"137

Opposing these situation, there are many who insist that far-

reaching tort reform, especially in the area of strict liability, should be
made.138

In this respect there is an interesting report by James A.

Henderson, Jr and Theodore Eisenberg that what they call a quiet
revolution

is now under way in the area of products liability and that

135.

KOBAYASHI,supra note 2, at 202-03.

136.

FLEMING,supra note 33, at 12.

137.

Id.

138. See F.VANDELL,STRICTLIABILITY
- LEGALANDECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
151 (1989).
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"[t]his quiet

revolution is a significant turn in the direction of judicial

~ecision-making away from extending boundaries of products liability
and toward placing significant limitations on plaintiff's
in tort for product-related injuries."

139

rights to recover

In that report Henderson and

Eisenberg indicate that "in 1979 plaintiffs prevailed in 40.5 % of
products cases showing definitive judgments and that in 1987 plaintiffs prevailed in only 32.5 % of such cases. "140

"In nearly every

significant area of products liability litigation, courts in recent years
have sent unambiguous signals that they are ready to rethink and pull
back on earlier commitments to extend the liability frontiers."

141

That is, first, in some cases they are taking away a pro-plaintiff

rule

they had earlier adopted, and "[s]econd, in an area that developed for
plaintiffs as rapidly as did products liability, ... courts now exhibit a
novel reluctance to established products doctrine to benefit plaintiffs.

"142

Thus, as most distinctive an example of this new trend,

Henderson and Eisenberg take up a recent decision by the Ohio

Henderson & Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L.REV.479, 80
(1990).
139.

140.

Id. at 523.

141.

Id. at 489.

142.

Id.
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Supreme Court,143in which the plaintiff attempted to show that an
originpl defect in the automobile manufactured and sold by the defendant caused a fire that destroyed an automobile and damaged the
plaintiff's

home. The auto was relatively new and had manifested

electrical wiring difficulties several times before the fire. The fire
occurred in the plaintiff's garage while the auto was parked there
during the night.
Notwithstanding

There was expert's testimony in plaintiff's favor.
these facts, the Ohio Supreme Court, suggesting the

possibility that the fire might have been due to, or the defect might
have arisen from, other sources not specifically excluded by the
plaintiff's

witnesses, refused to allow this case to reach the jury, and

concluded that "it is the plaintiff's burden to respond with evidence
which will permit a jury to go beyond speculation and render a judgment in accordance with law. Manufacturers are not insurers of their
products. "144 Henderson and Eisenberg insist that such decision
would have been inconceivable five or ten years ago.145 They say

143.State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 37 Ohio St.
3d 1, 523 N.E.2d at 489 (1988).
144.

Id. at 8. 523 N.E. 2d at 496.

145.Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 139, at 489.
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that this change began during early to mid-1980s.146 Even if this
change they point out is really happening in courts in the United
States, this writer believes that the difference in number of products
liability litigation that now exists between the United States and Japan
will not be affected drastically.

The reason is that the difference is not

mainly due to whether strict liability has been adopted but due to
whether the entire institution of civil action is structured in the favor of
injured plaintiffs and that the adoption of strict liability is only one
factor.

That is, such as whether plaintiffs can get information in the

hands of defendants through the discovery device,147or whether
they can obtain appropriate lawyers,148will have a determinative
effect on the number of filing of litigation.149

146.

Id. at 539.

147.

See infra section II C 2.

148.

See section II B 2 a.

149. KOBAYASHI,
supra note 2, at 120. Professor Kobayashi says
that if the assertion that products liability "crisis" exists in the United
States is true, its greater cause should be found in procedural aspects,
and that it is wrong to find its cause in the adoption of strict liability.
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2. Obtaining information for trial -- Discovery

a. Introduction
In products liability litigation, it is important for plaintiff to prove
the manufacturing process of the defective product.

For example, in a

strict liability case, plaintiff has to prove (a)that the defect caused the
accident and injuries; and (b)that the product had been defective when
it left the control, possession or hands of the defendant manufacturer.150 In order to prove (b), it will be crucial to get information on
how the product was manufactured by the defendant.

In this respect,

plaintiffs in the United States can get broad information through the
discovery and therefore they are relieved to a great extent from the
difficulty in establishing elements comprising a claim for relief in strict
liability.

On the other hand, plaintiffs in Japan are given very limited

means to get information.

As a result plaintiff always faces great

difficulty in proving the negligence on the part of the defendant and
causation between the negligence and the injury.151

150.5 SPEISER
& KRAUSE& GANS,supra note 71, §§18.7,18.8,

512-27.
151.

See KOBAYASHI,
supra note 2, at 129.

at
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b. Discovery
"Modern discovery rules provide means by which a party may
inspect documents and other personal or real property in possession or
control of another party and to some extent, in the possession or
control of a nonparty." 152The scope of discovery is extremely
broad. That is, "[ilnformation

can be obtained regarding any matter,

not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
action, whether or not the information sought will be admissible at
trial, just so long as it is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence." 153"The party seeking discovery must
designate the particular items sought to be inspected, copied, or
otherwise tested"154 (Fed.Civ. Proc.Rule 34(b)).

What will be

amazing to Japanese lawyers is that "[ulnder the Federal Rule and
many of its state counterparts, inspection ... is permitted on notice
without a court order"155 (Fed.Civ.Proc. Rule 34(b)), and that "[ilt is
the responding party who must go to court in the event that he believes that the evidence is not relevant, or that the time and place set

152.FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 19, §7.11, at 405.
153.ld. §7.2, at 381.

See also FED.R.CIV.P.26(b).

154.FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 19, § 7. 11, at 406.
155.Id.
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forth in the notice are inconvenient, or otherwise inappropriate" 156
(Fed.Civ.Proc. Rules 26(c), 34(b), 37(a)).

"When a party violates the

discovery rules by failing to appear at a requested deposition or by
failing to answer interrogatories, the opposing party may request
sanctions immediately ... "157(Fed.Civ.Proc. Rule 37(d)).

And "the

court may strike all or any portion of his claim or defence, thus limiting
what evidence may be introduced at trial.

In truly egregious situations

the court may go so far as to dismiss a plaintiff's complaint or enter a
default judgment against a defendant"158 (Fed.Civ.Proc. Rules 37(b)
(2), 37(d)).

"These sanctions are obtainable only in the event that

responding party willfully avoids proper discovery.

In the absence of a

court order to respond, courts have been very reluctant to hold that a
party's default was willful rather than merely negligent. "159 Therefore, "an aggrieved party most often ... seek[s] a court order [requiring
the opposing party to attend the deposition, to produce requested
documents, or to respond to the interrogatories under the rules]" 160

156.

Id.

157.ld. §7.16, at 415.
158.

Id.

159.

Id.

160.

Id. at 416.
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(Fed.Civ.Proc. Rule 37(a)(2)(3)).

Thus, "[o]nce an order has been

issued, if it is not obeyed, the disobedient party ... can be held in
contempt of court"161 (Fed.Civ.Proc. Rules 37(b)(1 )). "A person
who is in contempt can be find or even jailed .... "162 There are
many other lesser penalties that may be utilized by that court.

"These

include striking a portion of the party's case, granting a default judgment, dismissing the action, limiting the testimony available at trial, or
assessing the expenses of the opposing party in obtaining the sanctions. "163 What kind of penalty is appropriate is determined by trial
judge's broad discretion.164 These sanctions by courts seem to have
made the discovery effective.

161.

Id.

162.

Id.

163.ld. at 417.
164.

See id.
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c. Obtaining information in civil action in Japan
In Japanese civil procedure, information can be obtained through
perpetuation of evidence (Shako Hozen)165and order for the production of a document (Bunsho Teishutu Meirei).166
Perpetuation of evidence is originally a means to take the evidence in advance where the evidence might not be available at the
time of taking evidence, such as where a witness is seriously ill and it
is uncertain whether he will be alive at the time of taking of
evidence.167

To provide a plaintiff with the means to obtain informa-

tion, in some cases. The Japanese courts have allowed perpetuation

See MINSOHO[Code of Civil Procedure], art.343 (Japan) which
provides: Should the Court consider that there are circumstances
which would make it difficult to use evidence unless it be taken in
advance, it may, on application, take the evidence in accordance with
the provisions of this section.
165.

See MINSOHO[Code of Civil Procedure], art.314 (Japan) which
provides: clause 1; Should it find an application for an order for the
production of a document reasonable, the Court shall, by means of a
rule, order the holder to provide such documents; clause 2; Where a
third person is to be ordered to produce a document, such third person
must be examined.
166.

IKEDA,2 KIHONHOKONMENTAARU
- MINJISOSHOHO
[2 Commentary
on Basic Laws - Code of Civil Procedure] 123 (the Hogaku Seminar
Bessatsu No.72, 1985)(translation by this writer). In addition to an
order for the production of a document, a party can obtain court order
for the production or forwarding of the object for inspection. MINSOHO
[Code of Civil Procedure], art.335 (Japan). The object here includes a
thing, a human body, a place and the like. IKEDA,supra note 167, at
116.
167.
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of evidence by broadly interpreting article 343 of code of civil procedure of Japan. For example, by liberally stating that "there are circumstances which would make it difficult to use evidence"168 the courts
have expanded the pretrial gathering of information.

Where there is

possibility that another party or nonparty who has possession or
control of such documents may throw the document away or counterfeit them, perpetuation authority is granted.169 However, this is a
diverted use of perpetuation of evidence, and because there is possibility of its abuse if it is allowed to be used as a means to enable a
plaintiff to obtain information in another party's hands, there are
strong objections to such a use of it.170 Therefore, the diverted use
of perpetuation of evidence is inevitably limited.
The use of a judicial order for the production of a document is
also limited.

That is, it can be issued only for documents and only

where the holder of the documents has duty to produce them.171
Whether the holder of documents has duty to produce the documents

168.

See supra note 165.

169.Judgment of Mar.18, 1972. Tokyo Chisai (District Court of
Tokyo), Japan, 23 Kaminshu 130.
170.KOBAYASHI,
supra note 2, at 129.
171.A.MIKAZUKI,MINJISOSHOHO
[Civil Procedure] 476 (Supp.ed.
1981).
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is provided by article 312 of code of civil procedure of Japan, which
provides,
The holder of a document may not refuse to produce it: 1. If a party himself holds the document which he has
cited in the action;
2. If the party adducing the evidence is entitled to demand
that the holder deliver the document to him or to permit
him to peruse it;l72
3. If the document has been made out for the benefit of
the party adducing the evidence,173or concerning a legal
relation between the party adducing the evidence and the
holder of the document. 174

See id. at 476. For example, a shareholder or creditor of the
corporation, with permission of the Court, may inspect or copy the
minutes of the meeting of the board of directors. SHGHG[Commercial
Code], art.260-4(4).
172.

173."The documents made out for the benefit of the party adducing
the evidence" mean those which have been made to place the party in
a position of a obligee or obligor, or to prove the party's legal position
or rights or authority. Such documents include contract documents,
receipts, power of attorney and the like. TOGASHI,supra note 167, at
106.
174."The documents concerning a legal relation between the party
adducing the evidence and the holder of the document" include not
only those in which such legal relation is written but also those in
which matters pertinent to such legal relation or a part of the elements
of a provision which gives a party a right or changes its content or
lapses a right of a party,is written. However, they do not include the
inside documents of another party which have been made for his own
use. Id. at 107. For example, contract documents, letter of notice of
the rescission of the contract, certificate of a registered seal are as
such. But a draft prepared and circulated by a person in charge to
obtain the sanction to a plan [Ringisho] does not come under such
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Thus, in an action by neighboring residents against the defendant
corporation seeking removal of a nuclear reactor, Tokyo K6sai [High
Court of Tokyo] denied the duty of production of the defendant with
respect to documents which had been made by the defendant and
submitted to the Prime Minister for examination of the safety of the
nuclear reactor. The submission had been made in order to obtain
governmental permission for the defendant's installation.175

In

another action by the injured plaintiff suing for redress from the State
on the ground that his injury was due to inadequate installation of
controls on a river by the State, Tokyo K6sai [High Court of Tokyo]
concluded that an investigative report on rivers and roads planning did
not come under "the document concerning a legal relation between the

document. Id.
Judgment of May 22, 1972, Tokyo K6sai (High Court of
Tokyo), Japan, 25 K6minshO 209. However, there is a strong allegation against this decision. See e.g. K.SHINDO,MINJISOSHOHO
[Civil
Procedure] 372 (2d ed. 1981). It is notable in this respect that in an
action by neighboring residents against the Prime Minister seeking
rescission of permission of installation of a nuclear reactor, Takamatsu
K6sai (High Court of Takamatsu) concluded that the documents such
as those made by administrative agency through the process of governmental decision, the minutes of the Atomic Energy Commission,
investigation materials submitted by the applicant for permission, come
under "the document concerning a legal relation between the party
adducing the evidence and the holder of the document." Judgment of
July 17, 1975, Takamatsu K6sai (High Court of Takamatsu), Japan,
26 Gy6shO 893, 786 HANJI3.
175.
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party adducing the evidence and the holder of the document."

176

Though in recent years there is a tendency on the part of courts to
issue an order for the production of a document by broadly interpreting
the prerequisite of the order,l77 strong objections to that trend exist
on the ground of the possibility of abuse. In any event it is undeniable
that in products liability litigation, plaintiffs in Japan are facing difficulties in proving manufacturing defects because of the unavailability of
documents which are in the hands of the defendant manufacturer.

178

In addition, when the party ordered to produce does not comply with
an order, the sanctions for nonproduction are quite weak in Japanese
civil procedure.179

First, as to the order for perpetuation of

evidence, the disobedient party in effect is not applied any sanctions.
Second, as to the order for the production of a document, the disobedient non-party is imposed a correctional fine not exceeding 100,000

Judgment of Mar.19, 1979, Tokyo Kosai (High Court of Tokyo), Japan, 927 HANJI194.
176.

177.

See e.g., Judgment of July 13, 1977, Fukuoka Kosai (High

Court of Fukuoka), Japan, 30 KominshQ 175, which affirmed to issue
an order for the production of the clinical records of the injured plaintiff
by the medical institutions upon application of the defendant pharmaceutical company.
178.

KOBAYASHI,
supra note 2, at 129-30.

179.

Id. at 131.
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yen (equivalent to 714 U.S.dollars).18o As to the disobedient party,
article 316 of code of civil procedure of Japan [Minsoho] provides: If a
party does not comply with an order for the production of the document, the Court may deem the allegation of the other party relating to
such document to be true. There is a dispute on the effect of disobedience of the party to the order. The majority maintains that this
provision authorizes the court to deem the allegation of the other party
on the character, contents, and existence of such document to be
true, and that the facts sought to be proven by the disobedient party
may not be found.

On the other hand the minority maintains that the

court may find the facts to be proven by such document if the party
ordered does not comply with the order.181 Whichever view is taken, it should be pointed out that the sanction imposed against the

180.MINSOHO[Code of Civil Procedure], art.318 (Japan). Exchange
Rate $1 = ¥140.
See generally, Sato, Bunsho Meirei 0 Kyozetsushita Baai
[Where the party does not comply with a order for the production of a
document], 76 BESSATU
JURISUTO,MINJI SOSHOHO HANREIHVAKUSEN
[100 Selected Cases of Code of Civil Procedure] 21 2-1 3 (2d ed.
1982)(translation by this writer). As an example of the majority view:
Judgment of Sept.28, 1963, Saikc5sai(Supreme Court), Japan, 23
SaibanshO Minji 281. As an example of the minority view: Judgment
of Oct.18, 1979, Tokyo Kosai (High Court of Tokyo), Japan, 942
HANJI 17.
181.
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disobedient party to the court order is much weaker than the sanction
utilized in contempt of court in the United States. 182

3. Rules of evidence: similarities and differences

a. Generally
One of the conspicuous matters of distinction between American
law and Japanese law is the development of the rules of
evidence.183

This is attributable to two systems in American law --

the jury system and the adversary system.184

Since a jury consists

of laymen, it is necessary to select appropriate evidence to be presented to the jury and to stipulate rules on the manner of presentation of

KABAYASHI,supra note 2, at 131. In this respect there is an
indication that in the United States before the adoption of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, the situation was rather different
from today. That is,
182.

[To obtain information] a party could file a separate action in
equity, asking for a bill of discovery; that allowed a person to
uncover facts to support his own case, but could not be used to
ascertain evidence that the opposing parties had available for
trial. The net effect was to leave many a litigant in the dark
about what his adversary's position or evidence would be at
trial. FRIEDENTHAl,
supra note 19, § 7. 1, at 380.
H.TANAKA,EIBEIHO
SORONGE [2 General Remarks on AngloAmerican Law] § 584, at 462, (1980)(translation by this writer).
183.

184. H.KoBAYASHI,AMERICA
MINJI SOSHOHO [American Civil Procedure] 102, (1985).
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evidence.

This insures that the jury will not find facts erroneous-

ly.185 Also, the adversary system in which the parties (or their lawyers) control and shape the litigation, and the judge sits only to decide
disputed issues, seems to have had a great effect on the development
of the evidence rules such as cross-examination limitations and prohibition of hearsay evidence.186 In Japanese civil actions, the jury system has not been adopted but adversary system has been
adopted.187
Although the adversary system in Japan is on its face very
similar to the American counterpart, the concept of the adversary
system in Japan is focused on allocation of authority between the
court and the parties rather than opposition between the parties.188
Such differences have caused some distinctions between the two
countries in the rules of evidence.

185.2 TANAKA,supra note 183, § 584, at 462.
186.KOBAYASHI,supra note 184, at 102.
187.

Id. at 101.

188.

Id.
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b. Rule of relevance
Since "courts should not waste time receiving worthless information,

"'89

it is required that "evidence, to be admissible, must be of

possible aid to the trier of fact in making its decision."
words, "[r]elevancy

190

In other

is a necessary condition of admissibility with

respect to all evidence,

"'91

in the civil litigation in the United States.

Because Japanese courts also are required not to waste time receiving
worthless information,

the rule of relevance "is a necessary condition

of admissibility with respect to all evidence.

"'92

In this respect there

seems to be little difference in the practice of the two countries.

c. Hearsay
"Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant
while testifying

at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the

189.

FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 19, § 10.2, at 462.

190.

Id. at 463.

191. 1 M. GRAHAM,MODERN
STATEAND FEDERAL
EVIDENCE:
A COMPREHENSIVE
REFERENCE
TEXT9 (1989).

1 ide See MINSOHO[Code of Civil Procedure], art. 259, 294(4)
(Japan). Article 259 provides: Evidence tendered by a party need not
be taken if the Court finds it unnecessary to do so. Article 294(4)
provides: where a party's examination of a witness is redundant, or is
not related to the matter to be decided ... , the Presiding Judge may
restrict the party from examining a witness with respect to the redundant examination (translation by the author).
192.
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truth of the matter asserted."

193

"Hearsay is considered inherently

prejudicial because the party against whom it would be used would not
have an opportunity to cross-examine the person who made the
statement at the time it was made. The speaker may have been
joking, or guessing, or even deliberately lying. "194 Therefore, Rule
802 of the Federal Rule of Evidence provides that:

"[h]earsay is not

admissible except as provided by these rules or other rules prescribed
by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of
Congress. n However, there is a case in which "circumstances help to
assure that the evidence is reliable, [or] ...

in which the nature of the

issue is such that it is not likely that other evidence exists to prove the
matter in question.

n

195

In such a case, there is no need to fear the

prejudicial character of hearsay, or hearsay evidence is so valuable that
the excess of good over harm requires the exceptional treatment for
the general prohibition of hearsay evidence.196
rules ...

Thus, "the evidence

define a large number of specific exceptions

193.

FED.R. EVID.801 (c).

194.

FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 19, § 10.2, at 464.

195.

Id. at 465.

196.

See id. at 464.

197.

See FED.R. EVID.803, 804.

197

[which] fall
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into two basic categories [mentioned above]."

198

As examples of

the first category, there are "spontaneous utterances when the person
making the statement had no time to reflect or fabricate, business
records that are important to the day to day operation of the business
involved, and statements of physical symptoms made by a patient to a
doctor for purposes of diagnosis and treatment.

"199

Further, public

records and reports are included in the first category.

"Examples of

the second category include statements by a person as to his state of
mind, such as his intent, plan or motive, and statements of a person,
now deceased, as to the existence, identification, or revocation of her
will.

"200

In civil action in Japan it is judge who finds fact to be proven.
Since the jurist is not a layman like jurors in America and is therefore
deemed to have a high capacity to avoid distraction and find the truth,
hearsay evidence is not inadmissible per se in Japanese civil
acions.201

Whether hearsay evidence is inadmissible depends upon

198.

FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 19, § 10.2, at 464-65.

199.

Id. at 465.

200.

Id.

201. See e.g., Judgment of Dec. 5, 1952, Saik6sai (Supreme
Court), Japan, 6 MinshO 1118.
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the court's broad discretion.202 Generally speaking, in Japanese civil
actions the law of evidence allows a court's broad discretion and in
principle does not restrict the admissibility of evidence and the evaluation thereof by a court.203 This is because in Japanese civil actions
the principle of court's free conviction [Jiyu Shinsho Shugi] is adopted
in the areas of fact-finding

and the law of evidence,204 in order to

enable a court to make findings "according to its free conviction. "205
Thus, with respect to the rule of prohibition of hearsay evidence there
is a big difference between the United States and Japan, at least on
the surface.

However, since there are a large number of specific

exceptions to this rule in the United States, it may be that, in reality,
the differences are not so stark as first appears.

202.MOTOYOSHI,
supra note 167, at 96.
203.SHINDO,supra note 175, at 342-43.
204.

Id. at 342.

205.MINSOHO[Code of Civil Procedure], art. 185 (Japan), which
provides: In giving a judgment the Court decides whether or no
allegations of fact are to be deemed well-founded according to its free
tonviction as derived from the entire tenor of the oral proceedings and
the result of the taking of evidence.
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d. Character
"[B]ecause of its potentially prejudicial effect[,] [w]ith but few
exceptions, evidence of a person's character is not admitted to show
that he acted in conformity with his character on any particular occasion. "206

That is, character proof carries with it "[t]he danger that

the trier will assume that a poor driver was acting improperly on the
occasion in question, or that the driver might be held liable as punishment for past acts ... , "207 and it is considered to be more important
to avoid such a danger than to obtain the slight evidentiary value the
evidence might have in establishing what occurred in the particular
20a

case.

"In contrast, a person's habit ...

offered to prove that

conduct on a particular occasion was in conformity therewith, is
admissible generally ....

"209

Though it is sometimes difficult to

draw the dividing line between character and habit, we can say as
follows:
Character is the nature of a person, his disposition generally, or his disposition with regard to a particular trait such as

206.

FRIEDENTHAl,

supra note 19, § 10.2, at 465.

See FED. A. EVID.

404(a).
207.

Id.

20a.

See id.

209.

1 GRAHAM, supra note 191, at 505. See FED. A. EVID. 406.
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honesty, temperance, peacefulness, or truthfulness. Reputation
is the community estimate of the person's disposition. Reputation testimony is one method of proving character. Habit, by
contrast, describes an individual's regular response to a repeated
specific situation.210
In Japanese civil actions, for the same reason mentioned in the
hearsay section there is no restriction on the admissibility of character
information.

e. Offers to compromise
"It is not unusual during the course of pretrial jockeying among
the parties, that an offer is made to compromise.

If the offer is reject-

ed, under modern rules neither it nor statements made in connection
with it are admissible.

"211

In Japanese civil actions, there is no restriction in this respect.
However, in Japanese civil actions, courts are quite enthusiastic about
making the parties compromise.212

Therefore, it is unlikely that even

210.

1 GRAHAM,supra note 191, at 505.

211.

FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 19, § 10.2, at 464-66.

See FED.R.

EVID. 408, 410.
212. See e.g., Zadankai, Minji Saiban to Shimin [Civil Actions and
Citizens], 971 JURISUTO25 (1991). See also MINSOHO[Code of Civil
Procedure], art. 136( 1) (Japan) which provides: At whatever stage
the action may be, the Court may endeavor to effect a compromise, or
require a Commissioned Judge or Requisitioned Judge to do so (emphasis added).
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if the judge hears that an offer has been extended, he "may jump to
the conclusion that the offering party has conceded responsibili-

ty. "213

f. Subsequent remedial measures
"Evidence of subsequent repairs ...
because of its potential for prejudice."

214

generally is inadmissible
"Thus, in a tort action, the

fact that subsequent to the accident or injury, defendant made repairs
to the instrumentality that caused the harm is not admissible to establish that defendant was at fault for not making the repairs prior to the
time of the injury.

"215

In Japanese civil actions, any restriction of this kind does not
exist in practice.216

g. Evidentiary privileges
Because of important social policy reasons, "some evidence,
although valuable and nonprejudicial, will be inadmissible even though

213.

FRIEDENTHAl,
supra note 19, § 10.2, at 466.

214.

Id. see FED.R. EVID.407.

215.

FRIEDENTHAl,
supra note 19, § 10.2, at 466.

216.

See e.g., SHINDO,supra note 175, at 342-43.
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that might result in an incorrect factual determination
First, to protect conversations
relationship,

between individuals

at trial. "217

who are in a special

the laws of evidence provide so-called communication

privileges, such as attorney

and client conversations,218 discussion

between doctors and patients,219 mental health practitioners

and

patients,220 religious leaders and parishioners221 and husbands and
wives.222 Except for conversations

between spouses, "[t]hese

privileges are based on the idea that society wants to encourage its
members to seek appropriate

advice when they need it, and further,

that it must protect professionals

if they are to feel free to ascertain

the true nature of the problems presented. "223 Second, the laws of
evidence provide so-called testimonial privileges, such as the privilege
against self-incrimination224

and privilege of one spouse not to

217. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 19, § 10.2, at 466.
218.

See

219.

See id. 503.

220.

See id. 503.

221.

See id. 505.

222.

See id. 504.

UNIF.

R. EVID. 502 (1986).

223. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 19, § 10.2, at 467.
224.

See id. at 467 n. 25.
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testify against another in a criminal trial. 225 Further, there are other
privileges such as those with respect to Secrets of State and other
Officiallnformation226

and news media sources.227

"Without that

protection, sources of important information needed by society would
not be willing to come forward.

"228

In Japanese civil actions, similar evidentiary privileges are provided due to the same reasons.229 As to the privilege of news media,
though it is basically approved, it is approved only where the benefit
which will be obtained by not revealing the names of the news informants is believed to outweigh the loss of justice which would occur if
disclosure were not made.230

In this respect, this privilege does not

provide members of the news media with absolute protection.231

225.

See id. at 467 n. 26.

226.

See UNIF. R. EVID. 509 (1986).

227.

See FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 19, § 10.2, at 467 n. 28.

228.

Id. at 467.

229.

See MINSOHC[Code of Civil Procedure], art. 280, 281 (Japan).

See e.g., Decision of Aug. 31, 1979, Sapporo Kosai (High
Court of Sapporo), Japan, 937 HANJI 16.
230.

231.

See SUGIMOTO,
supra note 167, at 89-91.
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h. Admissibility

of documents

"Real evidence provides the trier of fact with an opportunity to
draw a relevant firsthand sense impression. "232 Most of the real
II

evidence introduced at trial is in the form of documents.

There are

two special rules that govern the admissibility of documents.

First is

the rule of authentication. "233 That is, it is required to show that
n[a document] is what its proponent claims"234 as a condition precedent to admissibility.

In Japanese civil procedure, the authenticity

of a

document is presumed if it bears the signature or seal of the party
concerned or of his representative where it is a private document,235
and if its form and purport are such that it purports to have been made
out by a Government official or some other public functionary in the
exercise of his official functions where it is a public document.236
However, if the adverse party disputes the authenticity

of such a

signature or seal, that must be proved to be authentic.237

232. 1 GRAHAM,supra note 191, at 447.
233.FRIEDENTHAL,
supra note 19, § 10.2, at 468.
234.

See FED.R. EVID. 901 (a).

235.MINSOHO[Code of Civil Procedure], art. 326.
236.

Id. art. 323.

237.ld. art. 325.

See also MICHISHITA,supra note 167, at 113.
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Second, a party is required "to introduce the original of a document or to establish that the original has been lost or destroyed before
other evidence of the document's contents will be admitted"238 (socalled best evidence rule). "The best evidence rule provides a guarantee against inaccuracy and fraud by insisting on the production at trial
of original documents. "239 In Japanese civil procedure there exists a
similar requirement of the original. 240

i. Cross-examination
"Cross-examination refers to the right of a party to propound
questions to a witness called to testify by an adverse party to test the
accuracy, sincerity and completeness of testimony given by the
witness on direct examination, and to develop relevant testimony of
the witness favorable to the cross-examination." 241 "[Ilt is the
principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of

238.FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 19, § 10.2, at 468.
239.1 GRAHAM, supra note 192, at 415.
240.MINSOHO [Code of Civil Procedure], art. 322( 1) which provides:
A document must be produced or forwarded in the form of the original,
an exemplification or a certified copy. This means that, in case of a
private document, the original must in principle be produced. See
SAKAGUCHI, supra note 167, at 111.
241.1 GRAHAM, supra note 191, at 557.
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his testimony are tested.

"242

A similar institution was adopted after

World War II in Japanese civil procedure.243

However, because of

the inexperience of lawyers in Japan, cross-examination is considered
to have dangers causing disorder and delay of litigation, and obstruction of fact-finding.244

Japanese civil procedure, although it adopted

the practice of allowing adversary cross-examination in principle,
permits a court to playa positive role in the examination of a wit245

ness.

Courts in Japan tend to attach little importance to lawyer-

conducted cross-examination.246

There are rulings which approved

the admissibility of the testimony which had not cross-examined.247

242.

1 id. at 558.

See MINSOHO[Code of Civil Procedure], art. 294( 1), (2), which
provides: (1) A witness may be examined by an adverse party after a
party who made tender of the witness finish his examination of the
witness. (2) The Presiding Judge may examine the witness atter the
parties finish their examinations of the witness (translation by the
author) .
243.

244.

MOTOYOSHI,
supra note 167, at 95.

Id. See MINSOHD[Code of Civil Procedure], art. 294(3) which
provides: Should be deem it necessary so to do, the Presiding Judge
may examine in person or permit the parties to examine the witness at
any time (translation by the author).
245.

246.

KOBAYASHI,supra note 184, at 102.

247.

See e.g., Judgment of Feb. 8, 1958, Saik6sai (Supreme Court),

Japan, 11 Minshu 258. Judgment of Sept. 13, 1975, Tokyo K6sai
(High Court of Tokyo), Japan, 837 HANJI44.
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This attitude of Japanese courts is in contrast to the American practice
in which "cross-examination

is a matter of right.

Cross-examination

constitutes an important aspect of due process ....

"248

This

seems to be due to the difference in the concept of adversary system.
That is, in Japan's adversary system even though the parties have the
authority to produce evidence, once it is produced it is the court which
has the authority to determine whether or not the evidence is
admissible.249

j. Satisfying the burden of persuasion
"According to the customary formulas a party who has the
burden of persuasion of a fact must prove it ...

in certain exceptional

controversies in civil cases, by clear, strong and convincing evidence,
but on the general run of issues in civil cases by a preponderance of
evidence.

"250

Proof by a preponderance means "proof which leads

the jury to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.

"251

"Thus, the preponderance of evidence

248.

1 GRAHAM,supra note 192, at 557.

249.

See KOBAYASHI,
supra note 184, at 102.

250. MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE § 339, at 793 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter MCCORMICK].
251.

Id. at 794.
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become the trier's belief in the preponderance of probability.

"252

Clear, strong and convincing evidence is a standard which has been
applied to (1) charges of fraud and undue influence, (2) suits on oral
contracts to make a will, and suits establish the terms of a lost will,
(3) suits for the specific performance of an oral contract, and so
on.253 This standard requires higher degree of persuasion than
preponderance of evidence standard, however, lower degree of persuasion than proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases.254
On the other hand, in Japan a party who has the burden of
persuasion of a fact is required to convince the court that the existence of the fact to be proved is certain.255

Though it is difficult to

say clearly, the standard of proof in Japan generally appears to be
stricter than that in the U.S. In an effort to relieve the injured plaintiffs
in industrial pollution cases from the burden of proof, it has been urged
that a lower standard of persuasion such as the probability standard
should be adopted in such particular cases as a standard of proof. 256

252.

Id.

253.

Id. at 797.

254.

Id. at 796-99.

255.

See e.g., SHINDO, supra note 175, at 338.

256.

See KOBAYASHI, supra note 185, at 263.
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In any event, in Japan only little study has been done with respect to
the issues of judge's free conviction and degree of persuasion.257

k. Summary
From what we have seen so far with respect to the comparison
of the laws of evidence between the United States and Japan, it may
be said that even though there are some differences in the laws of
evidence between the two countries, such differences are not designed to favor plaintiffs in personal injury or products liability actions.
Thus, it seems that differences in the laws of evidence do not have
any significant effect on the difference in the amount of litigation
between the two countries.

D. Remedies

1. Determining the amount of damages -- Jury system

"Jury trial is the hallmark of the American tort system. "258

"It

is uniquely associated with tort litigation, both because it functions
almost exclusively in tort cases and because the right to jury trial is

257.

See id.

258.

FLEMING,
supra note 33, at 101.
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rarely waived.

n259

Students of the jury system feel that many jurors

harbor a bias against corporate and other company defendants credited
with deep pockets.

Lay jurors often come from the lower income

spectrum and would naturally identify with tort plaintiffs, and the bias
is sometimes reflected in excessive awards.260
fact-finding

Also, it seems that

by jury is more unpredictable than that by a judge, and

therefore there is a tendency for plaintiffs to "take a gamble on jury
trial despite a less than-even chance of victory.

"261

Luckily or unluckily, jury system is not adopted in Japanese civil
actions.

In any event it is quite conceivable that the jury system in the

United States has promoted the filing of products liability litigation by
encouraging plaintiffs to expect recoveries even in a case with a
relatively small chance of victory.

This tendency appears to be accel-

erated by the fact that it is jury that assesses damages.

259.

Id.

260. Id. at 111-12 quoting the study in CHIN& PETERSON,
DEEP
POCKETS,EMPTYPOCKETS:WHO WINS IN COOKCOUNTYJURYTRIALS
(1985).
261.

Id. at 113.
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2. Collateral source rule

"Nowadays

most person injured in an accident manage to draw

on private or some sort of social insurance to meet part or all of their
losses. "262 When they receive such collateral benefits,
practice reduction
called "collateral

in American

thereof is not required in assessing damages (sosource rule").263 This practice is justified

reward to the diligent plaintiff.

Why must the plaintiff

as a

give up a good

share of the amount rewarded by the jury if the award purports to
indemnify

the plaintiff

for all his loss7264 "The collateral source rule

partially serves to compensate

for the attorney's

actually render 'double recovery'

share and does not

for the plaintiff. "265

In Japanese practice, the majority of scholars and courts are
very enthusiastic

about preventing the injured plaintiffs

from obtaining

double recovery. 266 They argue that "damages are compensatory

262. FLEMING, supra note 33, at 206.
263.

Id. at 209.

264.

See id.

265.Helfend v. Southern California Rapid Transit District,

1,12-13

(1970).

266. KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 127.

2 Cal. 3d
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and should not exceed the plaintiff's

net IOSS."267Thus, except in

case of private insurance, where the injured plaintiffs have actually
received benefits such as worker's compensation and other social
insurance, tort damages are usually reduced by the value of the benefits.268 Such a practice in Japan, to some extent, appears to have
discouraged injured persons from bringing lawsuits against the injurer.269 Recent developments brings U.S. practice closer to the Japanese model since "[r]ecent tort reforms, [in the United States], such as
those relating to medical liability, have invariably included substantial
limitations of the collateral source rule."270 Such reforms might ultimately result in the decrease of products liability litigation.

267.FLEMING,supra note 33, at 206.
268.KOBAYASHI,supra note 2, at 127. However if such benefits are
to be paid in the future but have not been paid, such benefits are not
to be taken into account in assessing damages. See Judgment of May
27, 1977, Saikosai (Supreme Court), Japan, 31 Mimshu 836.
269.KOBAYASHI,supra note 2, at 127. In this respect, also in the
United States, "payments from the tortfeasor himself or through or by
his insurer are not subject to the collateral source rule and may be
shown in mitigation or reduction of recovery. 2 SPEISER
& KRAUSE&
GANS, supra note 71, §8:16, at 531. Accordingly, in reality it may be
rare that double recovery occurs in the United States.
II

270.FLEMING,supra note 33, at 210-11 .
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3. Punitive damages

Punitive damages in American civil litigation are one of the
systems that are completely unknown to Japanese civil litigation.
"[Plunitive

damages are generally defined or described as damages

which are given as an enhancement of compensatory damages because of the wanton, reckless, malicious or oppressive character of the
acts complained of. "271 "While the universally agreed primary purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter egregious misconduct, "272they may also serve the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for his legal expenses.273 Undoubtedly, "[b]y raising the stakes,
punitive damages make the pursuit of claims worthwhile

or increasing-

ly lucrative for client and attorney"274 and thus, have been promoting litigation.

Further, since an award of punitive damages in a tort

case is within the discretion of the jury and juries tend to be empathetic with tort plaintiffs,275 this source of damages has formed a major

271.2 SPEISER
& KRAUSE& GANS,supra note 71, § 8.45, at 802.
272.FLEMING,supra note 33, at 214.
273.

See id.

274.

Id.

275.

See id. at 109-14.
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element in large verdicts in products liability litigation.

According to a

survey,276 in San Francisco in 9%, in Oakland 12.6% of all verdicts
in products liability and malpractice cases between 1983 and 1985,
juries awarded punitive damages. Though the number is comparatively
low, more than half of such awards were for 1,000,000

U.S. dollars or

more according to another survey.277 In this way huge amounts of
punitive damages are sometimes awarded and some defendant-manufacturers have been driven into bankruptcy.
are examples.

The asbestos recoveries

Thus, it is alleged that some kind of restriction should

be imposed on punitive damages.278
In Japanese civil actions, punitive damages have not been
awarded precisely because of their punitive nature.

In Japan, it is

considered that it is the function of criminal law to deter an unlawful
act or prevent it from recurring and that it is enough for the injured
person to be indemnified for his actual monetary loss in a unlawful act
case.279 However, such a viewpoint overlooks the fact that injured
plaintiffs often are not fully indemnified by the ordinary compensatory

276.

See ide at 216 invoking L.A. Times, Nov. 3, 1985, at 1, 27.

277.

See ide at 216 invoking L.A. Daily J., Feb. 11, 1986, at 1.

278.

See ide at 222-24.

279.KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 124.
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award.280

As a result, in Japan even if the plaintiff wins, usually he

will not be able to recover his complete loss and expenses. Among
other items, there are the attorney's fees that plaintiff always has to
bear.281 The inability to collect punitive damages, as well as the
difficulty in recovering all costs (including attorney's fees), has a
chilling effect on a plaintiff's initiative to bring a lawsuit against defendant-manufacturer.
In conclusion, punitive damages system in the American tort
system seems to encourage suits.

It is one of the biggest factors that

have brought about the big difference in the amount of product liability
litigation between the United States and Japan.282

E. Others

1. Former adiudication -- Collateral estoppel

In the United States, "the former judgment operates as an
estoppel as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the

280.

See FLEMING,
supra note 33, at 214.

261.

See supra section II B 2b.

282.

See KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 55.
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determination of which the finding or verdict is rendered. 11283 This
effect of a judgment is called collateral estoppel or issue preclusion.
Collateral estoppel is applied not only where the subsequent litigation
is between the same parties in the first litigation, but also where the
subsequent litigation is between different parties "one of [whom] had
been a party to the first action and had unsuccessfully litigated the
issue on that occasion.

"284

Such a nonmutual use of collateral

estoppel was first approved in a case where a defendant who was not
a party in the prior action asserted collateral estoppel defensively
against a plaintiff who was also a plaintiff in the prior action in which
he had lost.285

Later, in 1979, in Parklane Hosiery Company v.

Shore,286 the United States Supreme Court approved to apply collateral estoppel to a case in which a plaintiff who was not a party in the
prior action asserted collateral estoppel offensively against a defendant
who was also a defendant in the prior action in which he had lost.
There are several problems in allowing nonmutual use of collateral

F. JAMES JR. & G. HAZARD JR., CIVILPROCEDURE § 11.16, at
618 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter JAMES & HAZARD].
283.

284.

Id. § 11.24, at 632.

285.
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois, 402
U.S. 313 (1971).

286.

439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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estoppel -- especially offensive nonmutual use of collateral estoppel -such as encouraging people to adopting a wait and see attitude after
one suit was filed, thus resulting in unfairness to the defendant.287
Nevertheless, the reasons why nonmutual use of collateral has come
to be allowed in the United States are judicial economy, possibility of
inconsistent decisions, and adversary's expenses and vexation attending multiple lawsuits.288 It seems that judicial economy particularly
demanded this treatment when it is the case with the United States,
because the courts in the United States has been carrying vast number
of cases. Ironically, it appears to me that having approved offensive
nonmutual use of collateral estoppel is promoting people to file claims
because it will make people expect to get judgments in their favor
easily.289
On the other hand, the court of Japan have persistently denied
the application of collateral estoppel [sotenko], even if the second
litigation is between the same parties in the first litigation.290

supra note 19, § 14.14, at 689-90.

287.

FRIEDENTHAL,

288.

Id. § 14.9, at 658, n. 2.

289.

See 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979).

See e.g., Judgment of June 24, 1969, Saikosai (Supreme
Court), Japan, 569 HANJI 48.
290.
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The main reason is that if collateral estoppel is allowed, a person is to
"be concluded as to his or her legal rights without an opportunity to
litigate them.

"291

The protection of this opportunity

"the right to access to the courts

"292

under the Constitution

pan. "Because protection of this opportunity
tional right, the exceptions ...

is a matter of
of Ja-

is a matter of constitu-

are carefully defined.

"293

Neverthe-

less, the requirements of collateral estoppel are ambiguous, and
therefore there is a danger that such a constitutional

right is violated.

Thus, the Supreme Court of Japan rejected the application of collateral
estoppel even in a case in which to deny its application caused inconsistent decisions.294
The application of collateral estoppel will have an effect of
encouraging plaintiffs in mass-accident products liability suit to file
lawsuits against the same tortfeasor and in that respect it may have

291.

JAMES& HAZARD,supra note 284, § 11.22, at 629.

See KENPO[The Constitution of Japan], art. 32 which provides:
[n]o person shall be denied the right of access to the courts.
292.

293.

JAMES& HAZARD,supra note 284, § 11.22, at 629.

Judgment of June 24, 1969, Saik6sai (Supreme Court), Japan,
569 HANJI 48. There are strong objections to this decision and the
attitude of Japanese courts against collateral estoppel. See SHINDO,
supra note 175, at 425-26.
294.
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increased the number of products liability litigation

in the United

States, though it may not be the main cause.

2. Problem of time-consuming

In Japan it is believed that solving disputes through the judiciary
is too time-consuming.

According

to a survey,295 it was the second

most common answer (54 %) when people were asked the reason for
their reluctance

to solve disputes through the judiciary. 296 In fact, it

is reported that the average time interval from filing to adjudication

of

civil cases in district courts of Japan is 27.5 months.297 As a result
delay in litigation

has become a big problem in Japan.298

On the other hand, a survey299 showed that 156,240 (62.2%)
out of 251,177 civil cases pending on December 31, 1985 in the

295.OSAKA BENGOSHIKAI [The Osaka Bar Association],
BENGOSHI[Law, Trial, Practitioner] 81 (1977).

Ho: SAIBAN:

296.According to the same survey, the most common reason given
was "it is too costly" (64.6%). See id. In that survey multiple answers were accepted. Accordingly, the total exceeds 100%.
297.Zadankai, supra note 49, at 35.
298.

Id. at 34-36.

299.ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS, FED. JUD. WORKLD.STATISTICSDEC. 31,
1985, Table 10, at 14 (1986).
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United States district courts were less than one year and if cases
pending for one to two years are included, 208,521

(83.0%) were less

than two years. Considering that cases pending for less than one year
account for the large portion of all pending cases and that cases
pending for more than one year decrease steeply, it could be said that
plaintiffs in the United States can expect for disputes to be solved
through the judiciary earlier than plaintiffs in Japan.
In any event, the fact that people in Japan are feeling that
solving disputes through the judiciary is too time-consuming seems to
show that people in Japan believe that litigation does not pay. If so,
such a belief will work as deterrence to filing lawsuits.

This author

believes that this is one of the main reasons why there are many fewer
lawsuits in Japan than in the United States.300

300.

See Inaba, Minji Sosho Tetsuzuki Ni Okeru Funso Kaiketsu No

Arikata [The manner of Solution of Disputes in Civil Procedure], 97
JURISUTO240 (1991 )(translation by this writer).

Section III
SUMMARY OF COMPARISON

By having been comparing various systems adopted in either the
United States or Japan, it seems explicit that the cause of the difference in the amount of products liability litigation

between the United

States and Japan exist mainly in the manner of the institutions
actions in both countries.

of civil

That is, there are many systems which

encourage people to file lawsuits

in the United States, whereas there

are few such systems in Japan.

Moreover, some systems in civil

actions in Japan are deterrent for plaintiffs

to file lawsuits.

To be more specific on the above, particularly
four major factors which have caused litigiousness
and non-litigiousness

in Japan.

the number of lawyers.

we could point out
in the United States

First, there exists the vast difference

As a result, it is quite easy to find lawyers in

the United States (some lawyers are even advertising

85

on television!),

in
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whereas it is not so easy in Japan.301 Second, plaintiffs in the
United States can hire lawyers on a contingency basis, whereas those
in Japan always have to pay "Chakushukin" [undertaking fee] in
advance when they hire lawyers.302 Third, punitive damages are
allowed to be awarded in the United States, whereas they are not
allowed in Japan.303

Fourth, Japanese people's belief that litigation

does not pay must have been working as deterrence,304where there
seems no such belief in the people in the United States.
Further, as a whole, products liability litigation system in the
United States can be said that it is structured in a manner to encourage people to bring lawsuits against manufacturers by providing them
with various devices which facilitate people to bring a lawsuit technically and economically, such as contingent fee, class action, strict
liability, discovery, collateral estoppel, collateral source rule, and jury
system.

In addition, it seems that punitive damages have made

products liability litigation payor at least have given people in the
United States the chance that products liability litigation may pay.

301.

See generally supra section II B 2a.

302.

See generally supra section II B 2b.

303.

See generally supra section II D 3.

304.

See generally supra section II E 2.
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This seems to have been a great incentive for people to decide whether or not they file claims.
On the other hand, products liability litigation system in Japan,
as a whole, is not structured in such a manner as the American counterpart is. It is a traditional idea in Japan that the parties should be
placed on a equal position in a civil action. Therefore, systems in the
Japanese civil procedure have not been structured to facilitate litigation in plaintiff's favor.

In other words, there is no incentive for people

to file a lawsuit in Japan, as shown in section II. Besides, there are
some deterrent factors such as "Chakushukin" [undertaking fee], long
time interval to obtain adjudication, and non-adoption of collateral
source rule. Also, one of the reasons of denial of punitive damages is
that plaintiff should not get a profit by litigation, because, if such a
thing is allowed, there will be a danger of flooding of Iitigation.305
What is wrong with flooding of litigation?

Is it necessary to discour-

age all claims from being brought in order to eliminate worthless
litigation?

This writer believes that such a policy is completely wrong.

In addition it seems to have caused various problems as will be shown
in section IV. In any event, considering these matters, it is not

305.

See, KOBAYASHI, supra note 2, at 125-26.
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surprising that there are very few products liability litigation in Japan,
because every plaintiff must sustain an additional economic loss and
expenses other than the loss or damage caused by the injury even if he
wins.306
The view which seeks the cause of non-litigiousness of Japan in
the "deeply rooted cultural preference for informal, mediated settlement of private disputes ••307seems to be completely wrong as long
as it is used to explain the non-litigiousness of current Japan. Such a
view seems to be unable to explain the fact that the more recent it is,
the more people dislike litigation, though it is widely believed that the
more recent it is, the greater willingness to sue people have. That is,
according to a survey in 1973,308 in a questionnaire to the public on
whether they would consider going to court when they felt that their
rights had been violated, half of them answered that they would not

Therefore, when a plaintiff brings a lawsuit against a defendant, it is not mainly because he wants to recover his losses but
because he wants the defendant to be punished by the State. See
Kato, supra note 7, at 657-58. Accordingly, "once a lawsuit has been
filed, the percentage of cases that reach final court adjudication is
higher in Japan than in the United States
In the United States,
85 to 97[%] ... 'are dropped or settled
In Japan, 75[%] ... are
dropped or settled .... " Id.
306.

I

307.Hale'y, supra note 12, at 359.
308. NIHONBUNKAKAIGI[Japan Cultural Conference], supra note 14,
at 90 (1973).
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consider it except under extreme circumstances.

Those who answered

that they consider it was 23 %. Five years later when the same
survey was conducted,309 answers were 61 % and 11 % respectively. Litigation is extremely unpopular among businessmen. According
to a survey,310 only 0.6% answered that they plan to resort to
litigation to solve disputes in the future.

This figure is much smaller

than the preference for litigation shown by the average populace.
Since the average citizen is considered to be more influenced by the
culture than businessmen, such a result is inexplicable in the context
of a traditional cultural explanation.

This absolute small number of

businessmen favoring litigation as a means of dispute solution in itself
seems to disclose that the reasons of non-litigiousness in Japan are
not the Japanese culture, in which people are said to avoid confrontation and contentions.

By the way, this writer does not deny that there

is a tendency among Japanese people that they like to avoid contentions.

But it seems to this writer that such a cultural preference for

informal, mediated settlement of private disputes has come from the
hierarchial character of Japanese society which has been preserved
unintentionally through the non-litigiousness in Japan due to the

309.

Id at 104 (1982).

310.

See Kato, supra note 7, Table 20, at 679.
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ineffectiveness of the institutions of civil actions. As to the mechanism of preservation of hierarchial character of Japanese society, it will
be shown in the next section.

In any event, in such a society, under

unavailability of the effective judiciary, people have no alternative but
to resort to the informal, mediated settlement of private disputes due
to the pressure of society which is quite effective in such a highly
interdependent society with close human relationship as Japan.

Section IV
Underlying Reasons Affecting Institution of Japanese Civil Actions
Structured in a Manner to Discourage Litigation:
Its Impact on Japanese Society

A. Generally

In section III, this writer showed that it is due to the institutions
of Japanese civil actions which are structured not to encourage people
from filing lawsuits that Japan is a non-litigious society.

However, it

does not answer why the institutions were structured and have remained in such a manner. In this respect Haley claims that it was and
is a deliberate policy of the government elite who have feared that
"litigation [is] destructive to a hierarchial social order based upon
personal relationships.

"311

Haley also claims that "[t]he failure of

Japan to provide more judges and lawyers has been clearly a matter of

311.

Haley, supra note 12, at 373.
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governmental policy. "312 However, "why has the elite been so
successful in implementing its policy? Is the elite so all powerful as to
be able to force on the public what it wants?"313 This writer believes that such a explanation could hardly be true even before World
War II and still more cannot be true with such a democratic society as
post - World - War II Japan. In addition, why have lawyers been so
cooperative in such a policy though it will explicitly against their
profits.

In fact the average income of Japanese lawyers is not so high.

According to a survey, it is 33,000 to 38,000 U.S.dollars, whereas
that of American lawyers is 40,000 to 100,000 U.S.dollars.314
Have Japanese lawyers been bartering with the government elite for
new entry restriction of lawyers in exchange for their cooperation to
the governmental policy to keep the judiciary not promotive for filing
lawsuits?

If so, they have been making a absurd deal so far. This

writer cannot believe that such a deal has been made. Therefore, it
does not seem that Haley's explanation is persuasive.
Rather, this writer believes that the reason why the institutions
of Japanese civil actions were structured in a manner not to promote

312.

Id at 385.

313.

Tanase, supra note 15, at 655.

314.

Kato, supra note 7, Chart 7, at 667.
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litigation is that both the government elite and practicing lawyers did
not have concern about it when the main part of the current code of
civil procedure was enacted in 1920s. And the reason why the
institutions have remained in such a manner seems to be the small
number of practicing lawyers in Japan. That is, since the number of
lawyers have been limited to small number in favor of lawyers, there
have been no severe competition among them. As a result, though
they have not been able to get big money, they have usually been
making a good living. Therefore, they seem to have been content with
their situation.

Rather, they have been against the governmental
315

policy to increase lawyers fearing that their income may decrease.
Accordingly, they have not had a motive to move to change the
institutions of civil actions into something more to encourage people to
file a claim. Thus, the small number of lawyers has made the
institutions of civil actions remain as they are, and this, in turn, has
caused the small number of litigation, and then lawyers in Japan. In
sum, in this writer's view, it is not the government elite's intentional
policy but such a vicious circle that has been preventing the

315.

According to a survey in 1987, only 40 % agreed that the

number of lawyers are two small for the demand of society. See
JURISUTO, Aug.5, 1987, supra note 5, at 133.
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institutions of civil actions from changing into something more promotive for plaintiffs to file a lawsuit.

B. Impact of Non-Litigiousness on Japanese Society

What kind of impact has non-litigiousness had on the society of
Japan? There is a joke which says that the development of enterprises
in post - World - War II Japan owes much to the small amount of
litigation.

Apart from perhaps helping business development, does the

reticence to litigate pose special problems for Japanese society?

If

there are in reality few disputes in Japan, the absence of litigation is
nonproblematic.

But as shown in section I, disputes abound.

It is

conceivable that the number of disputes per capita in Japan almost
equals those in the United States.316

Can it be said that those

disputes have not surfaced because they have been solved by some
channels other than the Judiciary?

Some argue that adequate dispute

resolution has been done by administrative bodies or public corporations such as the Traffic Accident Consultation Center and the Center

See e.g., Zadankai, Minji Sosh6 H6 Kaisei Ni Nani 0 Nozomuka? [What Do You Expect in the Amendment of Code of Civil Procedure? -- translation by this writer], 971 JURISUTO177, 180 (1991).
316.
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for Citizens' Life.317 Though there is value in such organizations,
there are two problems in such an analysis. First, people often must
accept the settlement even when they are not content with it because
litigation is not easily available. Second, settlement by such administrative bodies or public corporations is often pointless against the
strong in society because it cannot be executed.

In sum, such organi-

zations cannot be a substitute for an active judiciary.

In addition, there

is an indication that people are not content with such a settlement.

In

other words, such organizations have not fully absorbed private disputes in Japan. Recently there has been a slight upward turn in the
ratio of litigation and a downturn in the ratio of mediation.318
Under these circumstances, lack of ready access to litigation,
this writer fears violations of people's freedom by the strong in the
society.

Without the availability of litigation, people cannot but accept

undue treatment of them by the strong in the society.

In such a

society, people tend to seek someone with superior power to protect
them.

It seems that such a system necessarily becomes a hierarchial

society in which liberty is inevitably limited. This may be happening in
Japan. There are many symptoms.

For example, it is a well-known

317.

Kata, supra note 7, at 681-90.

318.

Tanase, supra note 15, at 681-82.
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fact that Japanese workers work for many hours. Why do they work
so long? There are many conceivable reasons. But one critical
factor is that it is not easy for workers to find another job without a
significant decrease of their salary because employers do not want
someone who has worked for other employers.

So, if an employee

quits, he often has to take a cut in pay and do a job under less advantageous conditions.

If he has to stay in a given company forever, he

will be forced to avoid confrontation with his superiors in his company.
Lawsuits are inhibited.
Similarly, weak companies will be forced to be patient with the
big companies even when they are required undue dealings.
The unavailability of litigation is causing anther problem - - the
use of force.

For example, it sometimes happen that a lessor rents a

house to a tenant and the tenant does not move out when the contract
has expired.

In such a case, some lessors ask a strong-arm gang to

get the tenant out (so-called "Minji Kainyu Boryoku" -- Violence
Incidental to Civil Disputes -- translation by this writer).
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For the

Further, several years ago the use of force by loan shark(so-called
"Sarakin") to collect debts became a big problem in Japan. Some debtors
committed suicide fearing them. In the background of this incident, there
was a situation that banks did not finance people without a security.
Therefore, many people had to borrow money from "Sarakin".
This
writer believes that the reason why banks did not finance people without
319.

97
reasons set forth in this section, there are a number of societal flaws
caused by the unavailability of litigation in Japan.

a security is that banks do not have a practical means to collect debts
from malicious debtors who intentionally do not repay.

V. Conclusion

As shown by the foregoing analysis, this writer concludes that
non-litigiousness of the Japanese people has not come from a "deeply
rooted cultural preference for informal, mediated settlement of private
disputes" nor because of "absorption of controversy through the social
institutional setting".

Rather, the absence of litigation is attributable to

the ineffectiveness of specific processes involved in the institution and
maintenance of civil actions. And, as we have seen in section IV, nonlitigiousness can be a very favorable condition for the strong in a
society.

Although a society without litigation is sometimes a society

without freedom, this is not always the case. Non-litigiousness of a
society may give us a clue as to whether it is a society without freedom, but that is only one component.

This writer hopes that Japan

belongs in the category of the non-litigious society with freedom, a
rare but nonetheless possible condition.
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